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RISKS IN PRODUCTION
AND THE MANAGEMENT OF LABOUR
E.H. Bax*
SOM theme A: Structure, Control and Organization of Primary Processes
Abstract
The history of the risk management profession shows increasing specialization
within disciplines. In organizations this specialization is often institutionalized in
different (sub)departments each one taking into account different types of risk. As
a result the interrelations between these risks are neglected and therewith the
question arises who will manage the specialists. Further, an inventory of these
specializations shows that theory formulation and empirical research regarding the
relationship between risks, the organization of production and the management of
labour is underdeveloped. This paper presents a theoretical and empirical
perspective which could serve as a starting point for research in this domain of risk
management.
* Groningen University, Faculty of Management and Organization, P.O. Box 800, 9700 AV
Groningen, the Netherlands. E-mail: E.H.BAX@BDK.RUG.NL. This paper was presented at
the WESWA conference in Enschede, the Netherlands, November 18th 1994.
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1. Introduction
The assessment and control of risks is not a domain invented in the 20th century.
In the Netherlands the systematic study of risk assessment and risk accounting
started as early as the 17th century and is strongly associated with Johan de Witt
who elaborated mathematical methods to estimate life expectancies related to the
accounting of life insurance premiums. As risk can be defined as an uncertain
situation in which a number of possible outcomes might occur, one or more of
which is undesirable,1 risk assessment and risk management have in various
degrees always been part of the very nature of entrepreneurial activity. In the
literature such ’entrepreneurial risks’ are usually referred to as speculative risks
because they can be identified with both the probabilities of profit and loss. Con-
trary to speculative risks pure risks involve only the probability of losses.2
In this article the emphasis is on pure risks, notably those which originate
from the organization of primary production processes. Such risks cover a wide
range of potential effects varying from a simple breakdown of a production line till
and including spectacular events like the explosion of chemical plants and the
resulting pollution of the environment. In both cases companies have to pay a price
and therefore have an interest in preventing such events from happening.
In the following sections we will concentrate on the management of risks
originating at the shopfloor level. Although the study of risk has specialized along
different disciplinary lines sofar the study of risk related to the organization of
labour is not well represented. This is remarkable, not only because in many cases
human failures are at the heart of the explanation of production breakdowns, but
also because in the field of labour organization theories are now available that
enable us to a better understanding of such risks.
In section two a short history of risk management is presented. This history
is characterized by an emphasis on specialization and an one-sided conception of
rationality, topics to be treated in respectively the sections three and four. In section
five the attention is directed to the organizational context, especially the problem
of the management of complexity. The idea that Modern Socio-Technical theory
(MST) can contribute to effective risk management is developed in section six. To
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illustrate our theoretical viewpoints, in section seven we shortly report on a study
of risk in chemical process industry. In section eight some conclusions are drawn
with regard to the future of risk management.
2. The Origins of Risk Management
In the 1960’s the concept of risk management as such was introduced in the US.
Foremost it was associated with insurance. US enterprises felt their environments
to become more complex and dynamic. Consequently, the number of risks increased
while at the same time the understanding of the nature of these risks decreased. As
a result damages increased and therewith the number of claims on insurance
companies. The latter reacted by augmenting insurance premiums.3 In order to
control and manage their insurances business firms attracted a new kind of manager,
the insurance manager, responsible for the insurance portfolio of the firm. As many
of the risks large enterprises faced, turned out to be not longer insurable or too
costly to insure, the perspective of the insurance manager gradually enlarged: next
to insuring possible damage, the prevention of damage became a profitable and
often necessary alternative. Gradually the term insurance manager changed into risk
manager.4
Since its origins the domain of risk management thus was strongly related
to insurance and owes its main concepts and methods mainly from this perspective.
Within this frame of reference disciplines like probability theory, economics,
operational research, systems theory and decision theory contributed substantially
to the study of risks. Bannister and Bawcutt refer to these five disciplines as the
’main sources of risk technology’.5 To these the domains of psychology and
finance should be added.
Probability theory is at the heart of traditional risk assessment as it developed
within the domain of insurance. Its major advantage is that it enables to quantitative
risk-benefit analysis. The introduction of powerful computers has significantly
broadened the scope and possibilities of probabilistic risk assessment. However, the
essential weakness of probabilistic risk assessment is that computing can only be
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done if data are available to feed the machine with. I.e., one must have on
beforehand some ideas of the nature of the risks involved. These can be attained
either by the analysis of past experiences, by simulation, by game theory or by
making up scenarios.
Associated with risk management the central issue in economics is on
decision making under conditions of uncertainty. In this respect economic thinking
is related to probability theory and risk-benefit analysis. A major assumption of
economic theory is the ’Expected Utility Hypothesis’: a decision maker seeks a
maximalization of the expected value of an utility. According to the hypothesis a
risk is then dependent on the degree of deviation from the expected value and the
probability of this deviation to occur.6 Consequently, the attitude of the decision
maker towards a certain risk can be presented as a function of preference. In the
recent past many economists criticized this theory because it starts from an
unrealistic assumption of rationality. Notably Herbert Simon pointed to the fact that
rationality is bounded. A decision maker is unable to know all information and data
needed, to know all alternatives possible as well as their outcomes. As a result
decision makers can never reach a maximum utility and have therefore to accept a
lower level of satisfaction than the theoretically postulated maximum.7
The development of Management Information Systems (MIS) and Decision
Support Systems (DSS) certainly was an advancement to reduce the problem of
bounded rationality, although it did not solve the latter fundamentally. Such systems
consist of computer software which structure problems and information. Advanced
powerful computers undoubtedly can handle complex information better than the
human mind. However, the output still remains dependent on the input. Besides,
computer programs fail to take into account ’the element of knowledge and thinking
that is beyond logical analysis (and which) is covered by such indefinable quantities
as personal style, taste, intuition and good feeling, the fundamental indicators of
tacit knowledge’.8
Psychologists have put forward that probability theory and statistical
decision science can only produce a partial approach to risk assessment precisely
because they fail to take into account the human element in decision making.9 Thus
March and Shapira argumented that risks can be defined in many ways and that the
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definition chosen determines which decision rule will be applied and therewith the
outcome of the process of decision making.10 In a study by MacCrimmon and
Wehrung it is concluded that managers’ perceptions of risks substantially deviate
from the rules of decision science: managers focus primarily on the amount of a
potential loss while not taking into account the probability of occurrence of that
loss. This implies that a risk involving a small potential loss, but with a high
probability of occurrence is perceived as an acceptable risk while actually the
damages can be very high as the risk will frequently occur.11
The history of risk management as summarized in the former section leads
to some conclusions. The development of risk management led to specialization and
a division of labour along the lines of different disciplines and is dominated by a
specific concept of rationality. With the exception of psychology, most disciplines
that focus on risk largely neglect human behaviour and the effects of the
organizational context on that behaviour.
3. Specialization and Risk Management
The development of risk management as a science mainly developed within separate
disciplines. In the professional domain this led to specialization, or, to put it in
other words, to a division of labour between disciplines. One of the results of this
specialization along different lines is the present vagueness and ambiguity of the
terms risk management and risk manager.
A more serious effect is that in large enterprises this division of labour of specialists
induced an institutionalization of risk management in different departments within
the same firm. Such a split and compartmentalization of risk management blocks
a functional communication between specialists and promotes a particularistic
approach. The resulting difficulties to coordinate the specialists may create new
risks which often turn out to be unmanageable given the context of particularism.
In the literature one can find many descriptions of the disastrous effects of
such coordination failures. The most illuminating one is Medvedev’s analysis of the
Chernobyl disaster.12 His main thesis is that the explosion of the nuclear reactor
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was not due to poor technology alone, but must be explained from the interaction
between subsystems of which the technological subsystem is only one. Other factors
contributing to the catastrophe were inadequate training of operators and staff, poor
communications, long hierarchical lines, a culture of ritualism and secrecy provoked
by the centralized Soviet system, the shared responsibility for the nuclear plant by
rival ministries in Moscow and a reward system for the plant managers that latently
stimulated a disregard of safety regulations.13
Studies of catastrophes like Medvedev’s show that a crisis can seldom be
explained by one causal factor. The origins of crises that jeopardize the functioning
or even the very existence of systems should be found in an in time unique
interplay of several factors. It is the simultaneous and interdependent function of
such factors from which we can understand why things sometimes go wrong. This
holds not only for major crises like the Chernobyl disaster, but also for the
breakdown of production systems.
It may be clear that specialization within separate disciplines is a necessary,
but not a sufficient condition for effective risk management. What is presently
lacking is an approach which enables us to effectively integrate the knowledge
available.
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4. The Concept of Rationality
A second conclusion we can draw from the history of risk management is that it is
based on a strong belief in rationality. One may wonder why despite the almost
daily presentation of risk management’s failures in the media there is still left a
strong belief in the human potential to control risk. According to Berting this
optimism should be associated with the cultural history of industrialism itself. It is
the heritage of the Enlightenment with its emphasis on the replacement of the
traditional order by one based on the rules of a positivist logico empirical
science.14 In the resulting conception of the social order absolute rationality is a
keyword. Science, technology and industrialism are supposed to be able to expand
man’s control over his social and natural environment and to solve his major
problems. Of course, the development of science and technology may be
temporarily blocked by political and religious constraints, in the long run, however,
rationality will overcome15.
The predominance of the idea of rationality in Western culture has had a
major impact on the ways we deal with risks in our organizations and in society.
Firstly, risks can be controlled and managed or at least their consequences can be
mitigated. Thus the very problems that are created by modern technology are
believed to be solvable by technology itself. Secondly, as quantification is
considered to be a prerequisite to scientific rationality, risk assessment has become
dominated by quantitative methods, notably probabilistic risk assessment and risk-
benefit analysis. As said before, this implies that one must have on beforehand
some ideas of the nature of the risks involved. These can be attained either by the
analysis of past experiences, by simulation, by game theory or by making up
scenarios. Quantitative risk assessment methods seem to be based on the assumption
that the unknown can be known.
Thirdly, in turn the closed system approach of quantitative risk assessment
strengthened the traditional ideas of rational organization: unpredictable man has to
be made predictable and controllable. There seem to be two strategies to reach this
ideal. The first one is to substitute as many functions of human labour as possible
by machine operations. What is left can be controlled by the second strategy, i.e.
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bureaucratic organization: the application of hierarchical control associated with
specialization, training, the establishment of well defined rules and regulations and
the execution of proper sanctions.
The idea that specialization and bureaucratization lead to an increase of rationality
and therewith to a more effective control of risks is at least one-sided. As is
argumented below, such a type of rationalization increases system complexity and
affects systems controllability.
Increasing specialization and bureaucratization do not per se mean that
systems have become more rational. They imply, however, a shift in the nature of
rationality. Building on the works of Simmel, Pareto and Weber,16 Karl Mannheim
made the distinction between substantial and functional rationality. An action is
substantially rational if it reveals an intelligent insight into the interrelations of
events in a given situation. An action is functionally rational if it relates to a
definite goal and if it involves consequent calculation in order to reach that goal.17
Thus, substantial rationality has to do with the ability to understand the pattern of
interdependencies in a situation, while functional rationality comes close to Weber’s
concept of instrumental rationality (Zweckrationalität).18 The historical trend of
modernization and the concomitant processes of differentiation, specialization and
bureaucratization caused a growing complexity of social relations in society at
large.19 Consequently, substantial rationality decreased while at the same time
functional rationality increased. According to Mannheim this development has led
to a situation in which
’... the thinking out of a complex series of actions is confined to a few organizers
... A few people can see things more and more clearly over an ever widening field,
while the average man’s capacity for rational judgement steadily declines once he
has turned over to the organizer the responsibility for making decisions.’20
The shift from substantial to functional rationality as a response to increasing
complexity means that more and more people act on the basis of a restricted means-
to-end rationality. However, what seems rational to the individual acting in a
functionally rational way, may at the same time be irrational when viewed from the
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perspective of substantial rationality or from the perspective of another actor acting
from a different position in the organization.
One of the effects of this functionally rational response to problems of
complexity may be that the organization becomes ever more diffuse for the
individuals participating in it. Therewith the chances of ambiguous information and
ineffective communication are multiplied.21 According to Wagenaar the causes of
many a disaster can be reduced to cognitive failures, i.e. failures to process
information properly. Bureaucratization and specialization induce ’rule-based errors’
and ’knowledge- based errors’, the former originating from contradictory rules and
procedures, the latter from a restricted and false understanding of the situation at
hand.22 So per se rational action may induce risks if it is acted on in isolation
without reference to the complexity of the whole in which it evolves.
In the frame of our analysis of the relation between rationality, risk and
management, ritualistic conformity as a defense response should be emphasized too.
Already as early as the 1950’s Robert K. Merton pointed to this effect of
bureaucratic rationality.23 If the bureaucrat is confronted with unforseen situations
to which the rules do not apply, he will react inadequately and in a ritualistic way
by sticking to the rules. In two respects this response is defensive. Firstly, under the
condition of a lack of substantial rationality, for many in the lower ranks of the
organization rules are the only frame of reference to derive feelings of certainty
from in unknown and unanticipated situations. Secondly, people working in
bureaucratic organizations are submitted to sanctions if they violate the formal rules.
Even if things go completely wrong because one sticks to the rules, for the
individual rule conformity is the safest way to prevent the application of negative
sanctions upon him. In this sense bureaucratic rules and procedures should not only
be understood as mechanisms of social control but also as means that protect the
worker from the whims of management.24
According to Mannheim only those in key positions are able to tie the diversity of
functionally rational actions together and synthesize them on the higher level of
substantial rationality. Hence, a major question is whether or not those in power are
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actually able to control actions of individuals and groups within the organization in
such a way as to prevent substantial rationality of the system as a whole to be
violated. This focuses our attention to the role of management because it is
management that shapes and guides the organization and thus could counteract
negative tendencies of functional rationality therewith promoting effective risk
management.
However, usually managers do not react in such a way. Instead their inbuilt
cultural reflexes urge them to further strengthening bureaucratic control. This
phenomenon is called the ’vicious circle of bureaucracy’: rational bureaucratic
control evokes problems that are reacted to by the establishment of new ’rational’
rules that will evoke new problems, and so on. This process of ever increasing
functional rationality will gradually weaken the control over the organization instead
of enhancing it. There are two arguments that make this process understandable.
First of all, rationalization and bureaucratization of production systems have
led to a separation of production control and production itself. So most current
production systems in the Western world contain two separated subsystems: the
control system and the production system. The control system fulfils the functions
of administration, development, planning and control. It regulates the production
system which is exclusively oriented towards the execution of production tasks and
has no self-regulating capacity. Because of the split between control and production,
control of the system as a whole suffers as it is under these conditions not possible
for the production system to react directly to unforeseen variations and disturbances
that occur in the production process.
Secondly, decades of production rationalization along these lines have resulted in
a fragmentation of tasks within both the production system and the control system.
As the fragmentation of tasks within the production system increases, so does the
need for control. However, increasing differentiation within controlling subsystems
has led to bureaucratization and struggles about competence that prevent the
execution of effective system monitoring, control and problem solving.
The separation between control and production and the fragmentation within
both the control and the production system lead to the vicious circle mentioned
before: new problems are responded to by increasing differentiation and
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consequently effectuate further fragmentation and a progressive widening of the gap
between control and production therewith continuously decreasing the controllability
of the system as a whole.25
Therefore, we may conclude that in systems which develop according to the
path described above, the need for control ever increases while the control capacity
continuously decreases. We may therefore expect that the conditions for effective
risk management deteriorate gradually and that the probabilities of actual crises will
proportionally enlarge.
5. Complexity, Organization and Risk
From the above analysis it follows that organizational complexity is one of the
major sources of risks. The problems arising from this complexity can not be solved
by an isolated analytical emphasis on specific parts or functions. Ackoff therefore
pleas for a design oriented perspective based on an integrative holistic approach.26
Such a perspective does not so much concentrate on an in depth analysis of
subsystems and their parts within the organization as well as on the interaction of
parts and subsystems within the context of the organization as a whole. In its turn
the organization should be conceived of as an open system interacting with the environment.
In 1984 Charles Perrow published a book on the relation between the complexity
of organizations and their catastrophic potentials.27 The title of this book, ’Normal
Accidents’, points to Perrow’s main thesis that for some types of organizations
accidents are normal given the organizational characteristics. Perrow distinguishes
two pairs of variables that should be thought of as continua: complex versus linear
systems and tightly versus loosely coupled systems. Linearity, complexity, loose and
tight coupling are system characteristics which determine the occurrence and nature
of risks.
Linear systems are characterized by linear interactions: ’Linear interactions
are those in expected and familiar production or maintenance sequence, and those
that are quite visible even if unplanned’.28 A simple example of a linear system
is the traditional assembly line. The work stations are placed in a linear and logical
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sequence. The number of units that shape the total line is unimportant: in all cases
of failure the source of the malfunction can be easily spotted. It is relatively simple
to estimate the effects of a potential crisis in such systems and to design a line of
action to neutralise potential risks. Most interactions in industrial production
systems are of the linear type.
Risk management becomes more complicated if parts, units or subsystems
fulfil multiple functions:
’For example, a heater might heat both the gas in tank A and also be used as a heat
exchanger to absorb excess heat from a chemical reactor. If the heater fails, tank A
will be too cool for the recombination of gas molecules expected, and at the same
time, the chemical reactor will overheat as the excess heat fails to be absorbed...The
interactions are no longer linear. The heater has what engineers call a ’common
mode’ function - it services two other components, and if it fails, both of those
’modes’ fail’.29
The above case of the heater is an example of a system characterized by complex
interaction. ’Complex interactions are those of unfamiliar sequences, or unplanned
and unexpected sequences, and either not visible or not immediately compre-
hensible’.30 Of course, the case of the heater is rather simple and in engineering
many technical devices have been developed to prevent these kinds of accidents.
However, in real life complex systems are far more elaborated. The source of their
complexity is not only common mode function, but also proximity and indirect
information sources. They are further characterized by unfamiliar or unintended
feedback loops, many control parameters with potential interactions and limited
understanding of some processes.31 Further, complex systems may consist of both
technological and social subsystems that interact.
Complex systems are not necessarily high risk systems. A nuclear power plant and
a government bureaucracy are both complex whereas the former has catastrophic
potential and the latter has not. To explain such phenomena Perrow introduces a
second variable in his theoretical scheme: tight versus loose coupling.32
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Systems like nuclear power plants have a high risk potential not only
because they have many common mode functions (complex interactiveness), but
also because the parts, units and subsystems are tightly coupled. I.e., if something
goes wrong it has an immediate effect on other parts of the system. Tight coupling
means that there is no slack or buffer between parts, units and subsystems.
Government bureaucracies are also characterized by complex interactiven-
ess. However, here parts, units and subsystems are loosely coupled: there is slack
or buffer between them. Because of that, parts of the system can to a certain extent
behave independently without having much effect on the whole. In loosely coupled
systems slack or buffer creates time in case of emergencies and therewith provide
better opportunities to intervene:
’Loosely coupled systems ... can incorporate shocks and failures and pressures for
change without destabilization. Tightly coupled systems will respond more quickly
to these perturbations, but the response may be disastrous’.33
If we now combine the two sets of variables - linear versus complex interactiveness
and tight versus loose coupling - it is evident that the complex tightly coupled
systems are the ones with catastrophic potential and that from the perspective of
risk management we would like all our systems to be linear and loosely coupled.
However, reality is not as we would like it to be. In modern production systems
complex interactiveness and tight coupling cannot be avoided.
Although his book is on the analysis of high risk systems, in the last chapter
Perrow gives some clues as to risk management.34 He does so by linking central
versus decentral authority to interactiveness and coupling. The relations between
these variables according to Perrow are depicted in figure 1.
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Source: Perrow, 1984, p. 332.
Figure 1: Centralization/Decentralization of Authority Relevant to Crises
Organizations that fit into cell 1 require tight coupling for efficiency reasons. An
example is rail transport. Because interactiveness is linear failures can be foreseen
and, if they occur, they are visible. The response to disturbances and failures is
centralized and carried out top-down. If not, failures could expand over the whole
system because of tight coupling.
Cell 2 refers to complex tightly coupled systems. These systems are con-
fronted with inconsistent demands. On the one hand, tight coupling requires top-
down centralized leadership in case of crisis. However, because of the complex
interactiveness in these systems, unplanned and unexpected sequences may occur
that are not visible nor immediately comprehensible. Their very nature implies that
reactions to such disturbances cannot be built in the design on beforehand.
Therefore, disturbance detection and risk management have to be located on the
spot. This calls for a decentralization of the command structure.
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Loosely coupled linear organizations (cell 3) embrace most manufacturing
and assembly-line production. Here one has a choice between centralization and
decentralization. In most cases of industrial production that fall into cell 3, one can
however observe centralized authority. Probably this is due to the heritage of
Taylorism which is still deeply entrenched in every day management practice.
Given the option of choice between centralization and decentralization, in my view
decentralization should be preferred from the perspective of both reducing the
number of potential disturbances in production as well as the adequacy of risk
management.
Finally, the combination of complex interactiveness and loose coupling asks
for decentralization. Because of loose coupling, time, resources and alternatives are
available to respond to the unexpected which is inherent to complex systems. In
such a situation most benefits can be gained if the personnel at the spot is capable
and allowed to analyse and to act as it sees fit to prevent disturbances to expand to
other parts, units or subsystems.
From Perrow’s analysis we can conclude that because of restricted rationality not
all risks or disturbances can be surveyed on beforehand. Consequently, from the
perspective of risk management a perfect system design seems to be an impossible
goal to achieve. However, if we could manage to reduce complexity and tight
coupling in systems, we would be well on the way.
6. The Socio-Technical Contribution to Risk Management
Modern Socio-Technics (MST) relates directly to risk management, especially to
risks arising from the complexity of organizations. ’The Dutch approach focuses on
the structural architecture of the firm as a whole, regarding the controllability of the
total system as the central problem to be dealt with by the organization.’35 It offers
a solution to the problems of complex interactive and tightly coupled organizations,
at least to the extent that MST claims that the effects of external disturbances on
the organization can be substantially weakened by organizational re-design. The
starting point is the idea that the controllability of a system as a whole is
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determined by the relationship between control capacity and the need for control.
As a norm for total controllability of a system, control capacity divided by the need
for control should at least equal 1. Preferably the outcome of this ratio should be
larger than 1. The norm of total controllability can be met in three ways: by
increasing control capacity, by decreasing the need for control or by both increasing
control capacity and decreasing the need for control.
MST offers a wide variety of interrelated techniques and instruments that
help to re-design systems in such a way that the norm of controllability is met. In
the frame of this paper I cannot elaborate on these. The interested reader is referred
to the relevant literature.36 However, as some of the MST design proposals are
directly related to our argument, I will mention these here briefly.
First of all, MST seeks to integrate the functions of control and production.
Instead of attempting to integrate control and production as subsystems, MST aims
at the integration of control and performance functions. It introduces two concepts.
The control structure is the allocation and coupling of control functions. The
production structure is the grouping and coupling of performance functions.37
MST proposes to reduce the need for control of the production structure by
parallellization and by segmentation.
By parallellization the effects of disturbances externally induced into the
system are reduced. As MST has focused so far mainly on market related produc-
tion, its treatment of disturbances in this respect mainly relates to external demand
variation, i.e. changes in the demand for product mix and volume. Parallellization
means that production is organized in parallel independent production lines. After
products are clustered on the basis of relevant similarities for each cluster a separate
production line is developed. Thus the degree of variation within each line is low,
while the variation between lines is large. As a result the total variation that can
occur within the production structure as a whole is substantially decreased.38
Segmentation reduces the internal variety of production lines by the
selective clustering of performance functions into segments with a minimum of
interfaces.39 Instead of the specialization of workers which results in fragmentation
of production, segmentation aims at the composition of ’whole-tasks’, i.e. the
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clustering of performance activities that are logically interdependent and that can
logically be separated from other performance clusters at the same time.40
Parallellization and segmentation simplify the production structure and
induce a decrease of the need for control therewith increasing the controllability of
the system as a whole. In terms of Perrow’s scheme, the re-design of production
systems by applying parallellization and segmentation makes them less complex and
less tightly coupled.
Controllability of the system as a whole is further improved by MST
because it also aims at increasing control capacity. Here the principle is to organize
the control structure in such a way that control and performance activities become
integrated to the largest possible extent. In other words, the control function is
decentralized. This is done by the formation of ’whole-task groups’ that are respon-
sible for the execution of whole-tasks as defined in the production structure. Thus
the whole-task group not only performs the production function, but also the
function of control (preparation, monitoring, control, external regulation) to the
highest possible degree. In this way the gap between performance and control is
closed.
An important conclusion one can draw from the MST approach is that decentrali-
zation of authority is a major tool to increase the controllability of production
systems as a whole. Although MST analysis differs from Perrow’s, in their
outcomes the two are congruent to a large extent. Perrow’s analysis diverges from
the MST approach in the respect that MST does not differentiate between dissimilar
kinds of production systems, while Perrow does. The MST message is that the
controllability of all systems is enhanced by both the integration of control and
production as well as decentralization of authority. Perrow, on the other hand,
suggests that for linear tightly coupled systems centralization is the best solution
and that complex tightly coupled systems need both centralization and
decentralization.
We have to mind, however, that MST’s aim is to reduce complexity in
production systems as well as to make them more loosely coupled. It follows that
the implicit claim of MST is that systems which are now according to Perrow in
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the linear tightly coupled cell and in the complex tightly coupled cell can by re-
design be moved into the direction of more linear respectively loosely coupled cells.
Further research is needed to investigate which types of tightly coupled linear and
complex systems will respond to the MST claim and which types will not.
If the MST claim is true, decentralization of authority and control can be
a major contribution to risk management. However, we have to take into account
that the emphasis in the analysis of both MST and Perrow is predominantly
structural.
From the history of risk analysis and risk management as presented in section two
it can be concluded that an analysis of the relationship between risk prevention and
human behaviour at shopfloor level sofar is not a central issue in theory and
research. An exception to this is the work of psychologists. These, however, mainly
focus on individual behaviour and not on social behaviour. True enough, approaches
like Perrow’s and MST concentrate on formal social system characteristics, but they
lack an evaluation of actual social behaviour as it evolves at the shopfloor.
A strong plea for shopfloor level analysis within the frame of formal system
characteristics follows from the idea of bounded rationality. The total set of risks
can be divided in two subsets. The first subset can be thought of as comprising all
risks that are known because of past experiences or as an outcome of such
techniques as simulation and gaming. Such risks can be rationally managed by the
adaption of policies and organizational structures. The second subset consists of
risks that cannot be known. We assume that such risks exist but we are not able to
define them, let alone that we can take measures to prevent them to manifest
themselves and to grow into crises. Next to just wait and see, the only policy we
could follow is to put our trust into the workers at the shopfloor and to hope that
they will act adequately once the moment is there.
Related to undefinable risks decentralization of authority to the shopfloor
and increasing the substantial rationality of workers seem to be the only sensible
options, since we may expect workers to act adequately only if they have the
authority to do so and if they have the skills and knowledge. Concerning the latter
it is paramount that knowledge and skills are not only defined as technical entities,
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but also as social knowledge and skills: workers should know how their actions
relate to those of others and should be able to communicate and cooperate under
conditions of pressure.
From this perspective the MST approach is a promising starting point. By
parallellization, segmentation and the introduction of whole-task groups
organizational complexity is reduced and the substantial rationality of workers is
enhanced. In other words, by MST redesign the number of interfaces in the
organization is substantially minimized, authority is decentralized and within whole-
task groups workers should have a multi-functional orientation by which their
rationality is broadened. Thus MST promotes the detection of risks at their sources,
i.e. on the shopfloor, and in an early stage of development. Consequently, risks can
be more adequately reacted to. In other words, top-down risk management by
centralization and the line of command is substituted by bottom-up risk
management that relies on a broadening of workers’ knowledge, skills and capac-
ities of taking initiatives if things run out of hand.
From the point of view of risk management, however, MST has three weak points.
Firstly, MST is foremost a structural approach. The problem of organizational
culture is largely neglected. Structural change by redesign should be accompanied
by cultural change to prevent a misfit between structure and culture and to install
the basic values in workers in order to enable them to actually use the authority
vested in them. It follows that MST could gain if its design prescriptions would also
take into account the cultural dimension.
Secondly, although MST reduces the number of interfaces it seems not so
much to bother on the interfaces left after the process of re-design is completed.
Therefore, it does not answer the question how to deal with risks that originate from
the interfaces in the organization and with those that come from sudden vehement
crises in the external environment. Both types of risk management seem to call for
centralization and reliance on the top-down line of command which is contradictory
to our plea for decentralization sofar.
The problem of sudden and vehement crises in the external environment
that threaten the very existence of the organization (e.g. collapse of the stock
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market, strikes in related subcontracting firms, floods, fires, earthquakes, etc.) have
a much lower probability than risks emerging from the production process itself. If
one has to set one’s priorities, it seems therefore wise to focus on production related
risk management. Further, even if priority is given to decentralization at the cost of
the development of a top-down line of command we may hope that workers
initiative and creativity will compensate the lack of centralized coordination to some
extent.
The idea that the problem of remaining interfaces can only be solved by
centralization is only partially true. Much can be achieved by adequate training and
the rotation of personnel. In this way units, groups and subcultures are linked,
therewith reducing the risks that may originate from the interfaces between them.
In this respect, a lot can be learned from the Japanese experience. In Japan-
ese firms that work with whole-task groups the interface issue is tackled by training
the employee in ’contextual skills’ and by elaborate systems of job rotation.
Contextual skills are integration oriented. They have to do with the before men-
tioned capacity to perform different tasks (multi-functionality and flexibility), with
a positive attitude to cooperation, with communicative skills, with the quality to
adapt to new tasks, with leadership potential, with learning and teaching capacity
and with the ability to negotiate in a positive way. Contextual skills are learned by
job rotation both within the whole-task group and within the firm as a whole.41
A third weak point of MST is its neglect of informal organization. The
same holds for the Perrow approach. Both theories emphasize the formal
organization and undervalue processes of coordination and mutual adjustment that
go on outside the formal authority structure whether the latter is centralized or
decentralized. As to MST this is surprisingly since many authors of this school of
thought mention as their sources of inspiration studies in which precisely the
importance of informal organization is stressed.
The famous study of Trist and Bamforth42 on the effects of mechanization
in British coal mines pointed to the importance of informal communication43 and
the inability of more formal procedures to fulfil the same functions. The Hawthorne
experiments showed how powerful such informal organization44 may be as it
regulates production independent of management directives. Likewise Mumford45
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demonstrated the relevance of informal group norms to the quality of task
performance. According to Dalton46 top management is not able to impose
regulations against the will of groups lower down the line.
Informal organization is complementary to formal organization. It can be
a source of opposition to formal management’s policies. At the same time, however,
it provides mechanisms of mutual adjustment, alternative channels of
communication and social cohesion47. As such it overrides the detrimental effects
of the formal structure and enhances substantial rationality, i.e. the individual
participant’s ’intelligent insight into the interrelations of events’48 occurring in the
organization.
Informal organization then can compensate in those situations which were
not foreseen in formal design and procedures. This is not to say that management
should refrain from improving formal organization and rely completely on
informality. Especially not as in many cases informal procedures may be
contradictory to formal rules. Neglect of the gap between formal and informal
organization may cause a distortion of management’s view on reality, leads to
irrational behaviour which may turn out to be fatal if things actually go wrong.
In order to achieve the best possible conditions for effective risk
management, management additionally must be aware of informal organization, of
the social definitions of the situation as they emerge at the shopfloor, to know how
informal organization relates to formal organization and to attempt continuously to
close the gap between the two.49 This is an incremental process that develops
within the frame of dynamic conditions such as technological innovations, changing
markets and institutional arrangements.
In this respect the importance of leadership is clearly demonstrated in a
study by Guest50. He concluded that the improvement of the organization’s
performance could be related to management’s ability to integrate formal and
informal organization. It followed from his study that the more formal and informal
organization became integrated the more the number of incidents, of grievances,
sickness absenteeism and labour turnover decreased.
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7. Risk Management and Complexity in the
Chemical Process Industry
Bax empirically explored in the chemical process industry the theoretical
perspective on risk management as presented in the foregoing sections.51 Two
chemical plants were compared, ANCEL and NIMIL both belonging to the same
parent company, TYRAD.** The primary processes of these two plants can both
be characterized as complex and tightly coupled and did not answer the criteria of
MST design rules. The number of incidents - defined as accidents and near
accidents - in ANCEL as measured over a two year period was substantially higher
than in NIMIL.
From the theory of formal and informal organization the hypothesis was
derived that a negative correlation could be expected between leadership stability
and the number of incidents occurring. Adequate leadership in the meaning
described in the foregoing section can only be achieved if the manager involved
holds his position for a certain period of time both because it takes time for a
manager to get to know the informal organization before he will be able to handle
it effectively, and because managers too have their personal ways of managing and
of interpreting formal rules and procedures. As a result the lower ranks too need
time to get tuned to a new management style. Only then management becomes
predictable for those to be managed and contributes to an enhancement of
substantial rationality for the shopfloor. Consequently, from the above the
hypothesis was derived that, ceteris paribus, a negative relationship exists between
the stability of organizational leadership and the safety of production processes.
The stability of leadership was defined as the degree to which management
positions were submitted to changes in management personnel over time. Thus, if
in department A the position of department manager was fulfilled in one year by
one and the same person, while in department B this position was fulfilled in one
** ANCEL, NIMIL and TYRAD are fictitious names.
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year by two persons, the position of department manager in department A has a
higher stability than the same position in department B.
Before continuing to report on the test of this hypothesis, two additional
remarks have to be made. Firstly, from the perspective of integrating formal and
informal organization effectively, the time factor is a necessary though not sufficient
condition. Even if the time needed is available, this does not logically imply that
time is actually used to integrate formal and informal organization. Further, next to
situational factors, leadership performance is also dependent of the personality
characteristics of the managers involved which were outside the frame of the study.52
Secondly, the relation between leadership stability and safety is not necessarily a
linear one. We would rather hypothetically expect to take it the shape of a U-curve:
the number of incidents being high when leadership stability is low, then
descending and rising again where managers stayed in the same position for a long
period of time. The latter could be explained by the effect of routinization of the
management job. As only data covering a two year time period were available, we
were not able to test for a possible U-curve nature of the relation.
To test the hypothesis of the relation between the stability of leadership and
the number of incidents, a regression analysis was made where the total number of
incidents per month for both ANCEL and NIMIL is explained by the average
duration of time (per month) of leadership positions hold in both plants. The
regression was estimated by means of a dummy variable indicating the differences
between the plants. The regression equation found was (t-values between brackets):
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Y = 19.18 - 7.6 δ - .33 X;
(5.35, -5.92 and -2.55)
where:
Y = number of incidents per month;
X = average duration in months of leadership positions hold;
N = 48;
δ = 0 for ANCEL
δ = 1 for NIMIL.
The effect of X differed not significantly between the two plants. Only the constant
differed significantly between ANCEL and NIMIL: for ANCEL it was 19.18 and
for NIMIL 11.62. The adjusted R-square was .63 and all parameters were
significant at the 2 per cent level. In separate regressions for both plants the Durban
Watson statistic was respectively 1.75 and 2.03; so it can be concluded that there
is no problem with autocorrelation.
The above test result indicates that for ANCEL and NIMIL a negative
relationship exits between leadership stability and the occurrence of incidents.
However, one is left with the difference between the constants of ANCEL and
NIMIL. As such the difference found is not surprising since leadership is always
executed within an institutional setting that functions more or less as a given. This
holds the more for lower management which often lacks the power to change the
social configuration of the production processes to a substantial degree.
Given the above we set out to check what differences in the respective
conditions could next to leadership stability explain the differences in the
occurrence of incidents between NIMIL and ANCEL, the perspective being the
ways workers handle the rules and procedures to which they are submitted.
The first factor discovered was the way departmental management was tied
to the parent company (i.e. TYRAD). ANCEL’s management was fairly tied to
TYRAD’s bureaucratic hierarchy. Its degrees of freedom of adjusting TYRAD’s
general safety policy to the specific conditions of ANCEL’s primary process were
limited. Because the actual locus of control was vested in the higher echelons of the
TYRAD organization and the normative dependence of ANCEL was high, the fit
between formal norms as to how to behave at shopfloor level on the one hand, and
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the actual conditions of behaviour on the other, was weak. In such a situation one
runs the risk that informal organization is strengthened as opposite to formal
organization. Contrary to ANCEL, NIMIL management succeeded to formulate a
safety policy of its own adjusted to the specific conditions of NIMIL’s primary
production process. Part of this policy was the attempt to let the workers internalize
the norms of the safety and quality of the work done. Actually, thanks to its relative
autonomy NIMIL management was able to close down the gap between formal and
informal organization to a substantial degree.
The second factor related to safety was the geographical dispersion of the
installations that were part of the technology of the respective primary production
processes. ANCEL’s installations were widely spread over a large area. On the one
hand, this induced looseness of coupling between the installations, but it also
increased the complexity as it made it more difficult for operators, supervisors and
management to get an overview. The fact that the authority structure within ANCEL
was decentralized, was therefore more dependent on the spacing of the installations
than on the nature of the technology that made up the individual installations.
The effects of decentralization induced by geographical spacing were
manyfold. To mention the most important ones: Geographical spacing prevented
management supervisors to be frequently on the spot where the action was.
Information was second or even third hand. There was a substantial delay in the
processing of information due to distance. Management was unable to exert
effective control and thus could not check to what extent official and formal rules
were effective. Thus, even if ANCEL’s management would have had the leverage
to adjust TYRAD’s safety procedures to the specific conditions of the ANCEL
production process, they probably would not have known in what direction such
adjustments should go. It is easy to see that this situation only aggravated the more
leadership stability decreased.
The conclusion drawn from the study in the chemical process industry is that for
the two plants investigated and which can be characterized as complex and tightly
coupled the degree of complexity and of tightness of coupling as such do not
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produce a sufficient explanation of the differences between the two plants as to the
number of incidents occurring. The research suggests that adding to Perrow’s
scheme variables such as leadership stability, the degree of plant management’s
autonomy viz-à-viz the larger company, the effects of organizational culture at
shopfloor level, the nature of the interfaces between shopfloor and higher levels in
the organization and the geographical dispersion of the plant’s production processes
could be a fruitful perspective.
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8. The Future of Risk Management: Some
Conclusions
Industrialization meant an enlargement of scale of production and therewith a
growth of the complexity of production processes. In Western industrialized
countries these processes accelerated after World War II.53 This article did not so
much focus on the effects of growing complexity in society as a whole, as well as
on production related risks evolving from the increased complexity of primary
production processes.
In the 1960’s in US production enlargement of scale and growing
complexity led to a growth of the number of risks as well as to an increase of their
effects in terms of damages. Consequently, American firms were confronted with
rising insurance premiums and even with refusals by insurance companies to insure
certain risks. At present a likewise trend can be observed in the Netherlands too.
Next to this, governments tend to privatize social security as a result of which the
effects of risks at the shopfloor level have to be accounted for by the employer. In
the Netherlands this holds especially for sickness and the negative health effects of
the conditions of working life.
The rise of insurance premiums forced US firms to employ insurance or
risk managers, managers responsible for the control of the insurance portfolio. Thus
risk management became associated with risk assessment and risk-benefit
accounting. The more insurance premiums rose and risks became uninsurable, the
more the content of risk management shifted from accounting to prevention.
From its origins onwards risk management deals primarily with complexity.
In the foregoing sections we emphasized how an ever progressing division of labour
led to an increase of functional rationality and a decrease of substantial rationality.
This self sustaining mechanism of the so-called vicious circle of bureaucracy
weakens the controllability of production processes to a substantial degree and can
be associated with a strong belief in the issuing of formal rules and procedures in
order to master complexity and the related risks. However, as we stated before, for
the actor the promotion of functional rationality leads to a loss of overview and to
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ritualism and thus affects the competence of workers required for effective risk
management.
It is remarkable that the history of the risk management profession too
developed along the lines of a progressive division of labour and an increasing
specialization and is presently negatively affected by these. The study and teaching
of risk management is spread over different disciplines. In organizations this
specialization is often institutionalized in different subdepartments each one taking
account of a different type of risks. As a result the interrelations between risks are
neglected and the question arises who manages the specialists. The solution to this
problem may be the introduction of interdisciplinary oriented general risk managers
who are able to provide the overview needed.
Further, it is rather peculiar that among the specialists engaged in risk
management an active interest in the social and organizational conditions of task
performance sofar is lacking. I.e., specialists that take an active interest in the
relation between human labour and risk tend to concentrate on the effects of
production processes on the worker. In this tradition stand issues like the impact of
technology on the quality of working life, the effects of technology and
organization on health and so on. In these cases risk is defined as an entity
produced by the production process affecting workers. Starting from the idea that
people make mistakes and that many of these are of a systematic nature in the sense
that they logically follow from the ways production processes are organized, risk
management should put more emphasis on organization as a factor explaining
human failures.
A third remark to be made is that risk management today is rather limited.
It attempts to assess risks and to develop measures aimed at prevention. This
approach mostly evolves within the boundaries of the prevailing organizational
structures therewith neglecting organizational complexity as one of the major
sources of risks. Modern risk management could certainly gain if it would
incorporate a more design oriented perspective focused on the reduction of
organizational complexity.
In the foregoing we referred to Perrow’s theory on the catastrophic potential of
organizations as an approach that relates risk to the characteristics of organizational
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structures. Perrow distinguishes two variables that determine an organization’s
catastrophic potential: interactiveness and coupling. Especially production which is
complex interactive and tightly coupled should be considered to be dangerous.
Research in the chemical process industry pointed to the fact that Perrow’s analysis
is still rather rough. A a number of intervening variables were found which
explained the different ways workers reacted to complexity. Among these were such
factors like the stability of leadership, organizational culture, the structuring of the
relation between the shopfloor and higher echelons in the organization and
geographical spacing. Within the context of complexity these factors contributed to
the explanation of differences in the occurrence of incidents. Although these
findings should be considered to be of a preliminary nature they offer a fruitful
perspective for future research and a further elaboration of a theory of risk in which
emphasis is laid on the relation between organizational characteristics and the
behaviour of workers on the shopfloor.
Dutch Modern Socio-Technical theory (MST) seems to offer solutions for
some of the dilemmas presented before. It is a design oriented approach aimed at
the reduction of the complexity of production processes and the enhancement of
control. By re-designing the control structure in such a way that the power to
control is laid down as low as possible in the organizational hierarchy the
management of risks is substantially improved. By the instalment of autonomous
task groups the substantial rationality of the individual worker is enhanced.
However, from the point of view of effective risk management MST in its
present state has two weak points. Firstly, although by parallellization and
segmentation it reduces the number of interfaces in the production organization
substantially, it seems to be not so much concerned as to the limited number of
interfaces left after re-design. Secondly, MST is predominantly a structural
approach. Sofar it lacks an active interest in processes of cultural change to be
associated with the re-design of production structures.54 These criticisms do
however not imply a rejection of MST, but should rather be considered to be a plea
for a further elaboration to increase its power as a contribution to effective risk
management.
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From the foregoing sections it became clear that modern risk management
has everything to do with the design of organizational contexts in order to reduce
the probability of disturbances in production processes. We have shown that as such
it is closely related to the study of the conditions of work to the extent that the
latter largely determine the occurrence of human failures. In turn, organizational and
technical conditions of production processes themselves can affect the safety,
wellbeing and health of workers.55 Although risk management in the meaning of
controlling human failures is up till now a scientific domain separated from that of
the improvement of the quality of working life, both can gain if future research
manages to treat them as interrelated fields.
As risk management essentially means the prevention of undesired events
to happen, quality management can be defined as a specific type of risk
management by which low quality is the issue to be prevented. It is remarkable that
some of the dominant quality systems of today, notably ISO, seem to suffer from
the same weaknesses as traditional risk management. In most ISO approaches one
heavily relies on the issuing of formal rules and procedures in order to control
human behaviour without challenging the prevailing power structure of the
organization. Therefore, it seems that the prevailing approach to quality
management can learn some lessons from the experiences in other domains of risk
management.
Finally, as the fields of quality management, of the health and safety of
workers and of production risks are so interrelated and have so much in common,
it may be fruitful to integrate them more closely in the future. Actually, presently
in Belgium promising experiments have been directed to the development of one
integrated care system56 covering all three types of risks.
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Notes
1. This definition is derived from Merkhofer, 1987, p. 2.
2. J.E. Bannister and P.A. Bawcutt, 1989, p. 4.
3. Claes & Meerman, 1991, p. 4.
4. Doherty describes these developments as a trend ’from insurance
management to the more general risk management’. See N.A. Doherty,
1985, p. 5.
5. Bannister and Bawcutt, 1989, p.177.
6. J.L. Bouma, 1990, p. 111.
7. H.A. Simon, 1976, ch. 4.
8. Essinger and Rosen, 1991, p. 31.
9. Next to the decision making process psychologists also studied the ways
how risks can evolve from the different ways the decisions taken are
implemented, for example, the effects of different patterns of
communication and the sources of human errors. See B.A. Turner, 1978
and W. Wagenaar, 1989.
10. March and Shapiro, 1978.
11. MacCrimmon and Wehrung, 1986.
12. Zhores A. Medvedev, 1990. Notably the first part of this book.
13. In his analysis of the flood that in 1953 fell upon the Netherlands Kees
Slager also mentions that poor communications, a compartmentalization of
specialists, long hierarchical lines and a lack of understanding by those in
charge prevented an adequate reaction. See Kees Slager, 1992.
14. Berting, 1992, p. 50.
15. Berting, 1992, pp. 51-52. See for an extensive treatment of this subject also
Bax, 1990, pp. 7-35.
16. The relevant works of these authors are mentioned in the bibliography.
17. See Mannheim, 1940, pp. 53-54.
18. Weber, 1972, pp. 12-13.
19. Elsewhere I elaborated on this theme. See Bax, 1990, pp. 7-35.
20. Mannheim, 1940, pp. 58-59. This process of social development induces
feelings of fear and alienation in individuals which in Western Europe were
compensated for by the rise of mass movements in the 1920’s and 1930’s.
Although the attractiveness of mass movements is clearly a phenomenon of
the past, I think that Mannheim’s thesis is still valid. Nowadays the lack of
substantial rationality is mainly compensated for by the rise of religious
sects, of psychiatric treatment, by drug abuse and alcoholism and by
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hooliganism. See for a sharp description of the social functions of
hooliganism: William Buford, 1990.
21. De Sitter, 1989; De Sitter and Den Hertog, 1990; Van der Zwaan, 1991.
22. See Wagenaar, 1989.
23. Merton, 1968, p. 253.
24. See also Gouldner, 1954.
25. See Van der Zwaan, 1991: 142-144; Bax, 1992: 67-68.
26. Ackoff, 1981.
27. Perrow, 1984.
28. Perrow, 1984, p. 78.
29. Perrow, 1984, pp. 72-73.
30. Perrow, 1984, p. 78.
31. Perrow, 1984, p. 86.
32. Perrow, 1984, pp. 89-94.
33. Perrow, 1984, p. 92.
34. Perrow, 1984, pp. 329-335.
35. De Sitter & Den Hertog, 1990, p. 5.
36. De Sitter and Den Hertog, 1990; Kuipers and Van Amelsvoort, 1990.
37. De Sitter and Den Hertog, 1990, p. 14.
38. De Sitter and Den Hertog, 1990, pp. 16-17.
39. De Sitter and Den Hertog, 1990, p. 18
40. Van der Zwaan, 1991, 165-166.
41. Aoki, 1988, p 50.
42. See Trist and Bamforth, 1951 and also Trist, Higgin, Murray and Pollock,
1963.
43. See also Barnard, 1962.
44. Following Roethlisberger and Dickson we define informal organisation as
the actual personal interrelations existing among the members of the
organisation which are not represented by, or are inadequately represented
by, the formal organisation. See Roethlisberger and Dickson, 1950, p. 566.
45. See Mumford, 1959.
46. See Dalton, 1959.
47. See Barnard, 1962, chapter 9.
48. Mannheim, 1940, p. 53.
49. Already in 1954 Gouldner analyzed the relations between leadership and
formal and informal organization. He discerned three types of bureaucracy
of which ’representative bureaucracy’ is the one in which formal and
informal authority go together. See Gouldner (1954).
50. See Guest, 1962-a and 1962-b.
32
51. Bax, 1995.
52. So we abstain from more psychological models like Fiedler’s contingency
theory and cognitive resources theory in which personality traits and group
performance are related, mediated by the situation. See Fiedler, 1967 and
1978 and Fiedler and Garcia, 1987.
53. In my book on the modernization of Dutch society I analyzed these
processes as they developed in the Netherlands. See E.H. Bax, 1990, pp.
35-72 and pp.147-152.
54. Elsewhere I analyzed the relation between structural and cultural change
and put forward the view that structure, culture and technology are closely
related. See Bax, 1991.
55. In the Netherlands this is one of the crucial elements in the Law on
Working Conditions (ARBO) which aims to improve the safety, the health
and wellbeing of workers.
56. Here we refer to the Pellenberg Audit System (PAS). However promising,
a disadvantage of this system seems to be that with its reliance on formal
procedures it looks similar to the ISO approach. See Heselmans e.a., 1994.
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